Peering
Through a Glass Darkly
Responding to the Philosophical Problem
of Evil
By Dr. Steven
B. Cowan, Associate
Director, Apologetics Resource Center
The problem of evil is
no doubt the most serious challenge to belief in
God. Even religious believers find it
troubling that evil exists in the world—and so
much evil! It is puzzling, to say the least, that an
all-powerful, absolutely good being would allow evil
to exist in his creation. And yet it does. Evil and
suffering exist and they are often overwhelming in
their magnitude. Consider the recent Tsunami in the
Indian Ocean that took the lives of almost 200,000
people. Consider as well the infamous Nazi Holocaust
in which millions of Jews and others were mercilessly
slaughtered. Moreover, we can watch the evening news
on almost any day and hear of people in our neighborhoods
being robbed, beaten, and murdered. How and why could
God allow such things?
Some have found the paradox of evil to be unresolvable.
For example, the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus
threw up his own hands in despair of solving it, asking
his famous series of questions:
“Is he [i.e., God] willing to prevent evil,
but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but
not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able
and willing? whence then is evil?”1
There are, of course, many dimensions to the problem
of evil as Jim Beilby has pointed out elsewhere in
this issue of Areopagus Journal.2 My concern in this
article, though, is with the philosophical problem
of evil. I want to answer the question, “Does
the existence of evil (or of certain kinds of evil)
provide any strong reason to deny the existence of
God?”3
I will show that evil does not in fact pose any compelling
threat to belief in God.
Does Any Evil
Provide Reason to Disbelieve in God?
In classical discussions of the problem of evil, this
question was the primary focus. Those who proposed
the problem of evil (like Epicurus noted above) argued
that the existence of any evil whatsoever ruled out
the possibility of God’s existence. In other
words, the claim was made that the propositions “God
exists,” and “evil exists” are logically
contradictory. They could not both be true. So, if
God existed, there would be no evil at all. Of course,
we all know that there is evil. Therefore, the argument
goes, God does not exist.
At first glance, though,
it does not strike one as obvious that these two
propositions are contradictory.
For this reason, the late atheist philosopher J.L.
Mackie presented the argument in a more formal way
in order to bring out what he thought was the implicit
contradiction in trying to maintain the simultaneous
existence of God and evil.4 With some modifications
for the sake of clarity and precision, Mackie’s
argument goes like this:
(1) If God exists, he is omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent.
(2) An omnipotent being has the ability to prevent
evil.
(3) An omniscient being has the knowledge to prevent
evil.
(4) An omnibenevolent being has the desire to prevent
evil.
(5) Therefore, if God exists, there is no evil.
(6) There is evil.
(7) Therefore, God does not exist.
Are
the premises of this argument true? Every theist will
readily accept the
truth of premise (1). God certainly
has these attributes, though he has many others, too.
And, of course, no theist or Christian will deny premise
(6)—there is no doubt that there is much evil
in the world. If these and all the other premises of
the argument are true, then the conclusion follows
logically—there is no God. But, what about those other premises, premises (2)
through (4)? Though some have done so,5 most theists
would find it very difficult to deny (2). After all,
could not God have prevented evil simply by refusing
to create anything else? Or by creating a world that
contains only plants and rocks and not morally significant
creatures like humans? Likewise, a traditional theist
will not deny (3). If God is omniscient, then he knows
the truth of all propositions, past, present, and future.
Nothing can take him by surprise, not even the evil
choices of his creatures. Hence, God, if he exists,
would have all the knowledge he needs to prevent any
and all evil if he wants to.
The latter phrase is the
key one—if he wants
to. Premise (4) of Mackie’s argument asserts
that God does indeed want to prevent any and all evil.
It was Mackie’s assumption that an all-good God
would desire to prevent all evil. Is this assumption
true? The truth is that the Christian has no reason
to accept this assumption. Which means that the Christian
can claim that premise (4) is false. If it is false,
then the sub-conclusion (5) is unwarranted, and so
is the final conclusion (7).
How can the Christian justifiably
reject premise (4)? Of course, we know that God hates
evil (cf. Ps. 5:4;
34:16; Hab. 1:13; Jas. 1:13). So, the Christian theist
must admit that, all things being equal, God would
prefer that evil not exist in his creation. This is
why the Bible teaches that God will one day eradicate
evil from his creation. But, premise (4), as stated,
is ambiguous. What the Christian theist can agree to
is (4’) An omnibenevolent being has a prima facie
desire to prevent evil. That is, leaving all other
possible considerations aside, God has some reason
to prevent evil. But, this is consistent with God having
some reason to permit evil as well. It is at least
possible that God has a good reason—a morally
sufficient reason—to not prevent evil. If so,
it is clear that premise (4’) will not allow
the atheist to draw the conclusion that God’s
existence is incompatible with evil.
What might constitute a
morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil?
There are any number of possibilities.6 However, the simplest suggestion is that God allows
evil in order to bring about some greater good—a
good which could not be brought about unless evil existed
as its precondition. This suggestion has the luxury
of being open to at least some empirical verification.
We all know of examples, in our own experience and
that of others, in which good was brought out of evil
and suffering. My favorite example is a biblical one.
Genesis records the story of Joseph’s brothers
selling him into slavery (Gen. 37:25-28). Though Joseph
suffered tragically from the evil done him by his brothers,
at the end of the story, after his family and many
others had been saved from famine by his rise to prominence
in Egypt, he was able to declare, “You meant
evil against me, but God meant it for good in order
to bring about this present result, to preserve many
people alive” (Gen. 50: 20). Of course, the most
significant example is the evil murder or Jesus Christ
which Christians believe results in the salvation of
the world. In both of these cases, we see goods being
brought out of evil that outweighs the evils themselves.
In these cases, God had a morally sufficient reason
for allowing evil.
Now we cannot prove that
all the evil that God has permitted in his creation
will ultimately result in
the production of goods that far outweigh the evils
themselves. Nevertheless, it is possible that they
will (indeed, it is part of the Christian faith that
they will—cf. Rom. 8:18, 28). As long as this
is a logical possibility, then we can say that it is
at least possible that
(4’’) God has a morally sufficient reason
to permit evil, and thus an ultima facie desire to
not prevent evil (i.e., a desire that overrides his
prima facie desire to prevent it).
Given just the possibility of (4’’)—we
don’t have to prove that it is true—we
have no reason to believe that if God exists, there
would be no evil. In fact, if (4’’) were
true, then we would have reason to believe that God’s
creation would contain at least some evil. Therefore,
the mere existence of evil does not provide reason
to disbelieve in God.
Does Pointless Evil Provide Reason to Disbelieve in
God?
Most atheists today will agree with our critique of
the version of the problem of evil discussed above.
God’s existence is not incompatible with the
existence of any and all evil. However, perhaps God’s
existence is incompatible with a certain kind of evil
that exists. For example, the atheist William Rowe
has argued that God’s existence is inconsistent
with pointless or gratuitous evil. By “pointless
evil,” Rowe means evil that does not and cannot
serve a greater good. And Rowe believes that there
is such pointless evil in the world.7 He thus concludes
that God does not exist. Rowe’s argument may
be simply stated as follows:8
(1) If God exists, there would be no pointless evil.
(2) There is pointless evil.
(3) Therefore, God does not exist.
Not every theist will grant
the truth of premise (1). Some may very well argue
that God’s existence
is compatible with gratuitous evil.9 Most theists,
however, are inclined to accept premise (1). Indeed,
if you agree with the point made above that God has
a morally sufficient reason (such as to bring about
a greater good) for allowing any evil into his creation
in the first place, then you will be inclined to grant
premise (1) of this argument.10 God allows evil, but
when he does, he always has a good reason for doing
so, namely, to bring about some greater good that could
not be had without allowing the evil in question. So,
if there is pointless evil in the world, God’s
existence would be unlikely.
But, is there pointless
evil in the world? Rowe thinks there is. To show
that there is pointless evil, Rowe
introduces what he calls the “noseeum inference.” Like
the pesty little bugs that some readers may be familiar
with, a “noseeum” is something that you
cannot see—it is a “no-see-um.” And
a noseeum inference is a conclusion drawn on the basis
of what one does not see. The basic structure of all
noseeum inferences looks like this:
(1) I cannot see an x.
(2) Therefore, there probably is no x.
We all make noseeum inferences
everyday of our lives. Every time I go to cross a
street, I look both ways
and I step out into the street only after I “no-see-um” a
car coming. Daniel Howard-Snyder gives a couple of
more examples:
Suppose that, after rummaging
around carefully in my fridge, I can’t find a carton of milk. Naturally
enough, I infer that there isn’t one there. Or
suppose that, on viewing a chess match between two
novices, Kasparov says to himself, “So far as
I can tell, there is no way for John to get out of
check,” and then infers that there is no way.
These are what we might call no-see-um inferences:
we don’t see ‘um, so they ain’t there!11
Rowe applies this kind
of noseeum reasoning to God and evil. Rowe suggests
that if we cannot see a reason
for a particular instance of evil, then there is probably
not a reason. Suppose we hear about a very young child
who is tortured to death to amuse some psychotic person.
We think about this event and we examine all the circumstances
surrounding it. No matter how hard we try, we cannot
see any good reason why this child had to suffer the
way she did. Since we cannot see a reason why God would
allow this child to suffer, there probably is not a
good reason—the child’s suffering was pointless.
Of course, Rowe would be quick to point out that he
is not speaking merely hypothetically. There are cases
like this in the news every day—real-life cases
in which we shake our heads in frustration, wondering
why God would allow such a thing.
Is Rowe correct in his
conclusion? Do such examples prove that there is
pointless evil in the world? I
don’t think so. To see why, we must recognize
that noseeum inferences are not all created equal.
Some noseeum inferences, as we have seen, are reasonable
and appropriate. But, many are not. Suppose I look
up at the night sky at the star Deneb and I do not
see a planet orbiting that star. Would it be reasonable
for me to conclude that there is no planet orbiting
Deneb? Of course not. Suppose that using the best telescopes
and other imaging equipment presently available, I
still cannot see a planet around Deneb. I would still
be unjustified in concluding that there was no such
planet.
What makes the difference between this latter case
and (say) the case of the milk carton in the fridge?
Why is the noseeum inference regarding the milk carton
plausible and reasonable, and the one concerning the
planet around Deneb not plausible? Howard-Snyder explains
why by outlining what we may call the Noseeum Rationality
Principle:
A noseeum inference is reasonable only if it is reasonable
to believe that we would very likely see (grasp, comprehend,
understand) the item in question if it existed.12
The milk carton inference is reasonable because it
would be reasonable for us to believe that, if there
were a milk carton in the fridge, we would see it.
The inference about the planet orbiting Deneb is not
reasonable because, even if there were a planet orbiting
Deneb, it would not be reasonable for me to expect
to see it.
The crucial question before
us, then, is whether or not Rowe’s noseeum inference regarding God’s
reasons for evil is justified or not—whether,
that is, it is more like the milk carton example or
the planet example. More specifically, the question
is this: if God has a reason for allowing an instance
of evil such as the child being tortured to death,
is it reasonable for us to always expect to see it?
In his noseeum inference,
Rowe assumes that it would be reasonable for us to
expect to see God’s reasons.
But, should he/we assume this? Not if we take account
of other things that theists believe about God. On
the Christian worldview, we believe that we are finite,
while God is unlimited in knowledge and power and very
different from us. Surely, at the very least, we should
understand our relation to God on the analogy of infant
children in relation to their parents. As Stephen Wykstra
has pointed out, parents often have good reasons for
doing things to and for their infant children that
their children cannot begin to fathom—things
which the children may think are unjustifiably bad.13 I think, for example, about my own son’s vaccination
shots. He suffered pain that he did not want and could
not understand. Yet, we had good reasons to get him
those shots. So, clearly, the fact that he could not
see a reason why he needed those shots was not reason
for him to believe that his parents had no good reason.
Moreover, the Bible itself
tells us that God is incomparable (Isa. 40-45), that
his ways are passed finding out
(Rom. 11:33), that his ways are not our ways (Isa.
55:8). God is transcendent and very different from
us. We are limited, finite. God is not. God is infinite
wisdom. Moreover, the sin in our hearts clouds our
minds and makes our innate limitations even worse.
So, given what we know about God (that he is transcendent
and infinitely wiser than we are) and given what we
know about ourselves (that we are limited and sinful),
what should be our reasonable expectation with regard
to God’s reasons for permitting evil? Would we
expect in every case to see them? Or might we expect,
in at least some cases, to be mystified? The answer
is obvious.
Therefore, Rowe’s noseeum inference regarding
God’s reasons for permitting evil is not reasonable.
It fails the test of the Noseeum Rationality Principle.
This means he cannot assert premise (2) of his argument
from evil—we have no justification for believing
that there are in fact pointless evils in the world.
However, we can go further
than this. We can argue that we know that there are
no pointless evils. We
can make a “table-turning” argument to
which Rowe himself alludes. Premise (1) of his argument
claims that if God exists, there are no pointless evils.
So, what if we have strong, independent reason to believe
that God does exist? Wouldn’t we then have strong
reason to believe that there are no pointless evils?
The fact is that we do
have strong, independent reason to believe that God
exists. We do not have the space
here to give any details, but it needs mentioning that
there are many powerful arguments for God’s existence.
Contemporary Christian philosophers and apologists
have masterfully defended versions of many of the classic
arguments for God’s existence. William Lane Craig
has presented the Kalam cosmological argument which
contends that the universe had to have a beginning
and that beginning must have been caused by a transcendent,
personal being.14 Robin Collins and others have defended
the fine-tuning version of the famous teleological
(or design) argument which shows that the parameters
necessary for life to exist in the universe are so
incredibly precise that only an intelligent being can
adequately explain it.15 And Alvin Plantinga has developed
a modern version of the ontological argument, arguing
that the very possibility of a maximally perfect being
(i.e., God) is evidence for the existence of such.16 There are other strong arguments as well.17 With all
of this in mind, we can turn Rowe’s argument
from evil on its head:
(1) If God exists, there are no pointless evils.
(2) God exists.
(3) Therefore, there are no pointless evils.
The reason that Rowe does
not take this argument seriously is that he thinks
that Premise (2) is, at best, as
likely true as not. Yet, the arguments for God’s
existence are more powerful than he would like to believe,
a fact that some atheists are starting to realize as
evidenced by Antony Flew’s recent conversion
from atheism to theism.18 Thus, we have sufficient
reason to assert premise (2). Which means that we can
be confident that there are no pointless evils.
Does
Horrendous Evil Provide Reason to Disbelieve in God?
There are some evils in this world that are especially
distressing. Imagine, for instance, a young Jewish
child born just before World War II who winds up in
a Nazi concentration camp. This child is malnourished,
neglected, beaten, and tortured for several years until
finally committed to the ovens. The only experiences
this child has are ones filled with misery. Evils like
this are called horrendous evils. They are evils so
heinous that some have wondered whether those who experience
them have lives that are worth living. The lives of
these people seem to be such that, in the words of
Jesus, “it would have been better for them if
they had never been born” (cf. Matt. 26:24; Mark
14:21). Christian philosopher Keith Yandell thus defines
such evils more precisely as those evils whose “occurrence
in the life of a person renders the life that the person
lives from physical birth to physical death not one
worth living.”19
The critic of theism believes
that there are such horrendous evils and that they
pose a serious threat
to God’s existence. For example, there were children
who died in Nazi concentration camps like the one mentioned
above. Even if one cannot prove that God has no good
reason for allowing these children to suffer, one can
say that the lives of these children were so miserable
that they were not worth living. But, how could a good
God allow there to be lives that miserable? The argument
from horrendous evils, then, may be outlined as follows:
(1) If God exists, there would be no horrendous evils.
(2) There are horrendous evils.
(3) Therefore, God does not exist.
Both premises of this argument
may be challenged. Let’s start with premise (2). How do we know
that there actually are horrendous evils? The critic
may point to real examples of people who lived in abject
misery during their earthly lives, but to legitimately
claim that these lives were not worth living presupposes
something that no theist need or should accept. It
presupposes that this earthly life is all there is.
But most theists, and all Christians, believe that
this life is only a small drop in the bucket of our
total existence. We believe in life after death which
will last for eternity. More than that, we believe
that life after death (at least for believers) will
be wondrously blissful and glorious. As the Apostle
Paul said, “[T]he sufferings of this present
time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that
is to be revealed to us” (Rom. 8:18).
In light of this, we cannot
determine whether or not the life of the child in
the concentration camp was
worth living merely by looking at the tiny slice of
her life while on this earth. There is nothing in our
beliefs about God that would lead us to expect that
God must insure that a person’s experience in
this life be worthwhile for that person. We must look
instead at the totality of her life which extends far
beyond her mortal experience. When the totality of
her life is examined, it may well turn out that her
life was, overall, worthwhile. Thus, Yandell concludes,
If life extends at least
indefinitely beyond the grave, and an omnicompetent
good providence rules, then even
the existence of those who do least well will not be
such that it would have been better for them never
to have been. I do not see how one can answer the question
as to whether there are persons such that it would
have been better had they not existed without considering
the matter of their destiny—of whether, and if
so under what conditions, they exist beyond physical
death.20
Of course, the advocate
of the problem of horrendous evil may respond at
this point by reminding us of yet
other things we believe. “Don’t you believe
in Hell?,” he may ask. “Don’t you
believe that there are people (i.e., non-Christians)
who will not have a blissful afterlife? And surely
some people who wind up in Hell are among those who
are victims of horrendous evil in this life. If so,
then you cannot appeal to an afterlife to escape the
problem of horrendous evils. For some people will truly
and eternally have lives that are not worth living.”
Responding to this objection
takes me to premise (1) of the argument from horrendous
evil. This premise
asserts that God’s existence is incompatible
with the existence of human beings whose lives are
(ultimately) not worth living. And if there are people
who spend an eternity in Hell (never mind what their
lives may have been like in this life), then there
are people whose lives, seen as a totality, are not
worth living.
But, is it really the case
that the existence of God is incompatible with such
horrendous evil? For what
it is worth (!), Jesus did not think so. Speaking of
Judas, he said, “Woe to that man by whom the
Son of Man is betrayed! It would have been good for
that man if he had not been born” (Mark 14:21).
The implication here is that Judas was going to suffer
drastic consequences that entail what we have called
horrendous evil—a life not worth living—-as
a result of his sinful betrayal of Jesus.
So, once again, let us
bring to bear other doctrines that Christians hold.
We believe that all human beings
are sinners, law-breakers, who positively deserve the
wrath of God (Rom. 3:23; 6:23a; Eph 2:1-3; Ps. 51:5).
More specifically, what we all deserve is eternal punishment
in Hell. Since this is what we deserve, we cannot say
that a good God would be unjustified in allowing any
of us to experience horrendous evil, whether that evil
takes place in this life or the next. The problem for
the critic of theism is that he assumes that people
are basically good and that the “horrendous” suffering
that some people (may) endure is undeserved. But, the
Christian need not concede that any suffering is (ultimately)
undeserved. Hence, we may respond to the problem of
horrendous evil this way:
(1) Every human being is a sinner.
(2) Sinners deserve eternal punishment in Hell.
(3) Therefore, every human being deserves eternal punishment
in Hell.
(4) The experience of eternal punishment in Hell constitutes
a life not worth living (i.e., a horrendous evil).
(5) Therefore, every human being deserves a life not
worth living.
(6) Therefore, it is not the case that, if God exists,
there would be no horrendous evil.
Given the sinfulness of mankind, the existence of God
is actually compatible with the existence of at least
some horrendous evil. We cannot look at the Holocaust
victim and say that his suffering is inconsistent with
the existence of God. It may be that this person will
find God’s grace in Jesus Christ and enjoy eternal
bliss. In which case, his life, seen as a totality,
is not a horrendous evil. But, if he fails to find
God’s grace in Jesus and does live a life not
worth living (both in this life and the next), then
his suffering is no challenge to the existence of God.
Since that person is a sinner, any suffering that he
experiences in this life falls far short of the suffering
that he deserves and the suffering he experiences in
Hell is what he deserves. It is not wrong or bad for
a good God to mete out justice to sinners.21 Which
means that it is consistent with God’s goodness
that there be ultimately horrendous evils.
Conclusion
Evil is often mystifying. We find it difficult, sometimes
impossible, to understand how and why God can allow
the pain and suffering that we observe. And coping
personally with tragedy can try the strongest faith.
This article is not intended to answer directly any “why?” questions.
It is not intended by itself to offer comfort in the
midst of agonizing sorrow. The goal has been to answer
one philosophical question: Does the existence of evil
(or of certain kinds of evil) provide any strong reason
to disbelieve in God? The answer, quite simply, is
no. Steven
B. Cowan (Ph.D.) is Associate Director of the
Apologetics Resource Center and the editor of Areopagus
Journal.
NOTES
1 Epicurus as quoted in David Hume, Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion, Part X.
2 See James Beilby, “What is the Question? A
Look at the ‘Problems’ of Evil,” (pp.
4-8).
3 Though I claim to be addressing the philosophical
problem of evil, my arguments below can be seen as
providing responses both to what Beilby (see Ibid.)
calls the philosophical problem of evil as well as
the existential problem. I think he would agree that
the existential problem of evil has philosophical aspects.
4 See J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” in
Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 4th ed., ed.
Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 160-167.
5 For example, Rabbi Harold Kuschner has attempted
to solve the problem of evil by denying God’s
omnipotence (see his book When Bad Things Happen to
Good People, (New York: Schocken, 1981).
6 It is important to note here that most philosophers
of religion credit Alvin Plantinga with providing the
decisive refutation of the logical problem of evil
in general and of Mackie’s version in particular
with his famous “Free Will Defense” (see
his God, Freedom and Evil [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1974], 7-64). Plantinga persuasively argues that it
is logically possible that the only way that God could
create a world containing free creatures is by creating
a world in which at least some of his creatures go
morally wrong. Given this logical possibility, there
simply cannot be any logical contradiction between
the existence of God and the existence of evil.
7 See William Rowe, “The Inductive Argument from
Evil Against the Existence of God,” in Philosophy
of Religion: An Anthology, 186-193.
8 My discussion of Rowe’s argument is much indebted
to Daniel Howard-Snyder, “God, Evil, and Suffering,” in
Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael J. Murray (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 101-114.
9 See, e.g., Peter Van Inwagen, “The Magnitude,
Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy,” in
God, Knowledge and Mystery (Cornell University, 1995),
96-122.
10 It may be helpful to note that even those theists
like Van Inwagen (see note 9) who think that God could
allow pointless evils will still argue that there is
at least some over-arching reason that God has which
morally justifies him in permitting these “pointless” evils.
For example, it might be argued that God allows some
evil things to happen which he does not specifically
ordain because that is the “price” he has
to pay for having a world that contains free creatures.
I would suggest, however, that if this is true, then
these evils are not really pointless after all. There
may not be a specific reason unique to any given instance
of evil for why that evil happened, but there is a
reason that God has (a general, over-arching reason)
for why it happened nonetheless. This means that almost
all theists, including Van Inwagen, really do believe
that God’s existence is incompatible with truly
pointless evil.
11 Daniel Howard-Snyder, “God, Evil, and Suffering,” 103.
12 Ibid., 105.
13 Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Human Obstacle to
Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the
Evils of ‘Appearance’” International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 73-94;
and “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil” in
The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder
(Indiana University, 1996), 126-150.
14 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Wheaton, Ill:
Crossway, 1994), 77-125.
15 Robin Collins, “A Scientific Argument for
the Existence of God: The Fine-Tuning Design Argument,” in
Reason for the Hope Within, 47-75.
16 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 104-112.
17 For other recent presentations of theistic arguments,
see Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, eds., The Rationality
of Theism (New York: Routledge, 2003), 149-174.
18 See the account of his conversion in “My Pilgrimage
from Atheism to Theism: A Discussion Between Antony
Flew and Gary Habermas,” Philosophia Christi
6:2 (2004): 197-211.
19 Keith Yandell, “Good, Evil, and Theology,” (forthcoming
in an as yet untitled anthology edited by James Beilby
and published by Baker).
20 Ibid.
21 To anticipate a possible objection, I am not saying
here that every harm done to us in this life by others
is positively and directly deserved. Other people can
do us injustice. What I am saying, though, is that
we do not deserve a life that is free from suffering
and that God may sometimes use the injustices done
to us by others to fulfill multiple good purposes,
including temporal retribution for our sins. A biblical
example may help: God allowed the Babylonians to invade
Judah in order to punish them for their idolatry. Yet,
the Babylonians, seeking vainglory and plunder, committed
an injustice against Judah nonetheless—-an injustice
for which God held them accountable later (cf. Jer.
25:8-14).
(top)
Other Articles
by Dr. Steve Cowan
|
